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“NO MAN IS ABOVE THE LAW AND NO MAN IS BELOW
IT”: HOW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY REFORM COULD CREATE
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CURB WIDESPREAD POLICE
MISCONDUCT
Lindsey de Stefan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent months, it has been difficult to ignore the overwhelming
presence of police violence in the media.1 Hardly a month has gone
by without headlines asserting use of excessive force, brutality, or other
misconduct in some corner of the United States.2 It seems that no
region of the nation has been unaffected by the violence, with civilian
deaths at the hands of law enforcement cropping up from San
Francisco3 to New York City4 to South Carolina,5 and almost everywhere
in between. And with public confidence in law enforcement at a
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1
Commentary and criticism about American police has spanned various forms of
media and traversed many genres. See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy
Central television broadcast Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing the grand jury’s decision not to
indict the officer who killed Eric Gardner, explaining: “I think what is so utterly
depressing is that none of the ambiguities that existed in the Ferguson case exist in
the Staten Island Case, and yet the outcome is exactly the same: No crime, no trial. All
harm, no foul.”).
2
See, e.g., Unarmed Black Mo. Teen Shot After Altercation, Police Say, CBS NEWS (Aug.
10, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michael-brown-shootingunarmed-black-missouri-teen-shot-after-altercation-police-say/; Josh Sanburn, Behind
the Video of Eric Garner’s Deadly Confrontation with New York Police, TIME (July 23, 2014),
http://time.com/3016326/eric-garner-video-police-chokehold-death/.
3
See Timothy Williams, San Francisco Police Officers to Be Dismissed over Racist Texts,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/us/san-franciscopolice-officers-to-be-dismissed-over-racist-texts.html?_r=0.
4
See Christopher Mathias, Video Shows NYPD Officers Beating Brooklyn Man After He
Appears to Surrender, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2015, 1:11 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nypd-beating-thomasjennings_55b0ff8fe4b07af29d57a1c0.
5
See Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with
Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/
08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html?_r=0.
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twenty-two year low—with only fifty-two percent of United States
citizens asserting that they have considerable confidence in law
enforcement6—the nation has clearly taken notice.7
Naturally, these violent incidents raise important questions for
many Americans, regardless of locale or the type of community in
which they reside. Why is this happening? And how can we stop it?
Unsurprisingly, extensive media commentary has invited a myriad of
proposed answers to these inquiries and has even generated some
potential solutions. Some point to a lack of education and opine that
officers need more comprehensive training to teach them how to
“defuse the sorts of deadly, racially charged confrontations” that have
recently been highlighted in numerous communities throughout the
country.8 Others suggest that allowing citizens to record police would
create officer accountability, serve as a disciplinary basis for abusive
behavior, encourage the use of justified policing tactics, and generally
deter misconduct.9 Others still suggest that police culture is to blame
since rookies shape their attitudes about the use of force based on the
words and actions of fellow officers,10 and because the warrior
mentality of policing fosters an “us” versus “them” relationship
between law enforcement and citizens.11 In fact, a few experts have
even suggested that there has not been a wave of police violence, but
that mainstream media is merely covering brutality more frequently

6

See Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years, GALLUP (June
19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx
(explaining that 25% of Americans have a “great deal of confidence” in police, 30%
have “some confidence,” 27% have “quite a lot” of confidence, and an all-time high of
18% have either “very little or no confidence in police”).
7
The international community has also reacted to U.S. police brutality. See, e.g.,
Adam Taylor, How the Rest of the World Reacted to the Ferguson Verdict, WASH. POST (Nov.
25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/25/
how-the-rest-of-the-world-reacted-to-the-ferguson-verdict/ (“‘So the U.S. government,
when talking about their own country, forgets about democracy, human rights,
protection of “peaceful protesters” and people’s right to protest,’ Russian news outlet
Pravda.ru proclaimed . . . .”).
8
Phillip Swarts, Police Need Better Training and Community Relations, Presidential
Task Force is Told, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2015/jan/13/police-brutality-solutions-are-training-community-/?page=all.
9
See Carol M. Bast, Tipping the Scales in Favor of Civilian Taping of Encounters with
Police Officers, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 61, 97 (2015).
10
See David Lester, Officer Attitudes Toward Police Use of Force, in AND JUSTICE FOR
ALL: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 177, 182–83 (William
A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1995).
11
Sue Rahr & Stephen K. Rice, From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American
Police Culture to Democratic Ideals, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/248654.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
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and comprehensively.12
Irrespective of whether there has been an increase in the
incidence of brutality or whether the nation is merely recognizing what
has been an ongoing reality for many United States citizens, the
existence of a problem is now inescapably obvious. The solution,
however, is decidedly less clear. Perhaps none of the aforementioned
proposals are the right answer. Alternatively, and more likely, maybe
they are all the answer—at least partially and in combination with a
number of other considerations. It is improbable that a single factor
can be deemed the sole cause of widespread police misconduct. Of
course, an elaborate problem with multiple dimensions will require an
equally multifaceted solution. In fact, any adequate resolution will
likely require the cooperation of many individuals and entities across
various disciplines and industries.13 But no matter how winding, every
path to change must begin with a single step. And the most logical
place to begin is by reforming the stringent protection from civil
liability enjoyed by law enforcement officers alleged to have violated
individual constitutional rights.
This Comment will explore how judicial amendment of the
qualified immunity doctrine—specifically as it is applied to law
enforcement officers—could serve as a catalyst to begin to rein in
police misconduct. Part II will describe the general history of the most
significant statutory provision in this context, § 1983, and the
expansion of constitutional torts that occurred in the mid-twentieth
century. Part III focuses on the judicial development of qualified
immunity in the Supreme Court and explains the status of the doctrine
today. Part IV discusses some of the most significant practical
problems with the modern qualified immunity jurisprudence and its
application. Part V goes on to analyze the recent spotlight on police
use of force. Finally, Part VI proposes that judicial amendment of
qualified immunity application will serve as an effective first step in
decreasing the overall incidence of police misconduct in the United
States.
12

See Eliott C. McLaughlin, We’re Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News
Coverage, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015, 7:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/us/
police-brutality-video-social-media-attitudes/ (discussing the lack of accurate statistics
regarding police killing civilians in the line of duty or police use of excessive force).
13
For example, implementing more comprehensive training would take the
combined efforts of experts in police brutality to design such training, as well as the
cooperation of police forces nationwide. Statutes protecting those who audiotape
police would require congressional or state legislative action—or both. And a change
in police culture would necessitate the active participation of police unions and local
law enforcement nationwide.
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II. THE COURT’S EXPANSION OF REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
To appreciate the qualified immunity doctrine and its modern
implications, one must first journey briefly down the historical path
that preceded its inception. That path begins with § 1983 of Title 42
of the United States Code, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.14
Although the statute now finds its home in the United States
Code, it was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
and was colloquially referred to as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” at that time.15
In the post-Civil War Reconstruction years, the so-called Radical
Republicans in Congress were becoming increasingly worried that
murders, whippings, and other (mostly) Klan-perpetrated brutalities
in some southern states were preventing newly freed slaves from
voting.16 These fears were affirmed when the 1870 elections brought a
wave of violence.17 After most affected state governments failed both
to punish the perpetrators of those atrocities and to protect the
victims, Congress intervened by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
which included what we now know as § 1983.18 In the subsequent
ninety years, § 1983 was largely inconsequential;19 but in 1961, when
14

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Ian D. Forsythe, A Guide to Civil Rights Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: An
Overview of Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Precedent, THE CONST. SOC’Y,
http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
16
David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of Villainy”: The Unknown History of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7 (1999).
17
Id.
18
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174–76 (1961), overruled in part by 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
19
See Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—
Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8–12 (1985) (explaining
th
“as the 20 century dawned, the Nation’s commitment to civil rights lay in remnants”
as a result of the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretations of the Civil Rights Acts, gains
15
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the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Monroe
v. Pape, the statute began a rapid ascent to a position of significance in
constitutional and civil rights jurisprudence.20
In Monroe, the Court held that § 1983 provided a remedy to
individuals “deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and
immunities” as a result of a government official’s abuse of his
position.21 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on its earlier
statutory construction of the phrase “under color of” as including acts
of an official that are in violation of state law.22 The Court also reviewed
the legislative history of the original Civil Rights Act in considerable
detail and determined that one of Congress’s primary purposes was to
provide a federal remedy for infringements of constitutional rights in
circumstances in which a state remedy was theoretically, but not
practically, available.23 In so concluding, the Court vastly expanded the
understanding of—and, thus, the potential application of—§ 1983 as
a tool in civil rights litigation.24 Indeed, after Monroe, the number of
cases brought under the statute skyrocketed,25 and § 1983 has since
made by Democrats in Congress, and the move toward reconciliation); Eric H.
Zagrans, “Under Color of” What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA.
L. REV. 499, 499–500 n.2 (1985) (explaining that § 1983 “languished in obscurity” until
1961, with only twenty-one cases brought under § 1983 in federal courts between 1871
and 1920—only nine of which made it to the Supreme Court).
20
See Forsythe, supra note 15.
21
365 U.S. at 172.
22
See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951); Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 111 (1944) (“It is clear that under ‘color’ of law means under ‘pretense’
of law.”); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (“Misuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”).
23
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174–75 (describing the “lawless conditions” of the South and
the failure of those states to provide any “effective redress”).
24
See Blackmun, supra note 19, at 19 (explaining that in the twenty-two years
before Monroe, the number of § 1983 claims to reach the Court “can almost be counted
on one hand”); David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 28
(1989) (opining that “the Court freed the [Civil Rights] Act from a narrow and
unjustified construction”); Michael Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts:
From Statutory Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53, 53 (1986)
(asserting that “the Supreme Court revived a long-neglected, ninety-year-old
statute . . . making it the vehicle for a broad cause of action to remedy constitutional
violations”); Zagrans, supra note 19, at 500–01 (averring that the Court “breathed new
life into the moribund [Civil Rights Act]”).
25
See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge’s
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORDER 557,
563 (1973) (describing the 1100% increase in cases brought under § 1983 in the
decade after Monroe); History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_federal_question.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2016) (“Civil rights cases, particularly suits filed under Section 1983,
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become the so-called “statute of choice” under which to bring
constitutional tort lawsuits against government officials.26 But Monroe
was not the Court’s last word on available redress for constitutional
violations—rather, it was just the beginning of a long and tumultuous
relationship.
A decade later, the Court created a new cause of action that is, in
effect, the federal analog of a § 1983 claim—the Bivens action.27 In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the
Court concluded that there is a private right of action for violations of
federal rights perpetrated by federal (rather than state) officials.28
While Bivens did not directly implicate § 1983 or litigation
thereunder,29 Bivens did further expand the availability of private
remedies for constitutional torts. Then, seventeen years after Monroe,
the Court expanded the ambit of § 1983 even further.30 After
undertaking a second (and equally exhaustive) review of the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in Monell v. Department of Social
Services, the Court overruled a portion of its Monroe holding by
concluding that municipal bodies could be subject to liability under §
1983.31 However, the Court provided a substantial shield to municipal
bodies by holding that a municipality could incur civil liability only
when it was itself the cause of the constitutional violation alleged, rather
than imposing liability vicariously based solely on its employment of
the tortfeasor.32 Put differently, the Monell Court concluded that a
municipal body might be subject to liability when “the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body’s officers.”33 But the Court left the door for
became one of the largest sources of federal court business in the late twentieth
century.”).
26
Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 25.
27
See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong With Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV.
851, 851 (2010).
28
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
390, 392 (1971).
29
By its very language, § 1983 does not apply to constitutional rights violations by
federal officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added) (specifying its application to
“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia . . . .”).
30
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
31
See id. at 690.
32
See id. at 694 (emphasis added) (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.”).
33
Id. at 690.
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any further municipal exemptions from liability wide open: “[W]e
express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity beyond
holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled
to an absolute immunity, lest our decision that such bodies are subject
to suit under § 1983 ‘be drained of meaning.’”34
Noticeably, none of these early cases directly grappled with the
qualified immunity doctrine,35 and one might naturally wonder how
they amount to significant steps on the path to its conception. Indeed,
the aggregate effect of these decisions appears to be a pivotal
expansion in the development of constitutional rights by allowing
individuals greater opportunity to seek redress when government
officials violate their constitutional or statutory rights. However, in the
wake of these cases, the Court began to face the practical
considerations of increased liability for government officials: its
disallowance of vicarious municipal liability meant that, in most cases,
the only potential defendant—and thus the only party who might
shoulder the burden of damages to the plaintiff—would be the official
who had inflicted the constitutional injury.36
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The qualified immunity doctrine has diverged substantially from
the general course toward expanding constitutional rights that Monroe
and its progeny began to pave in the 1960s and 1970s. It has instead
veered off down a long and winding byway that continues until this day.
In fact, it would sometimes seem that the two paths now travel in
opposite directions altogether. Notably, the statutory text of § 1983
does not explicitly or impliedly provide for any immunities;37 but as the
Court gradually increased liability for public officials who had violated
constitutional rights, it correspondingly started to extend the
immunities that had traditionally been available at common law.38
Interestingly, the Court conceded that the statute’s text is broader than
the common law of torts was in 1871 because it “purports to create a
34

Id. at 701 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974)).
Save, of course, for Monell’s express declination to decide questions of
immunity.
36
See Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 455–56 (1978).
37
See supra text accompanying note 14.
38
See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997) (“We have . . . recognized that
Congress intended [§ 1983] to be construed in light of common law principles that
were well settled at the time of its enactment.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557
(1967) (expanding the common law good faith and probable cause defense that was
available for false arrest and imprisonment to actions brought under § 1983).
35
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damages remedy against every state official for the violation of any
person’s federal constitutional or statutory rights.”39 In order to deal
with the lack of legal and historical context to fit the field of
constitutional torts, the Court has come to rely on loosely related
common law causes of action and their corresponding immunities40 in
an attempt to tailor them to the structure of modern government.41 In
so doing, the Court has gradually but consistently expanded the scope
of immunities available, both in terms of which officials are entitled to
such immunity42 and in regard to the types of situations in which
immunity is available.43 The Court has arguably enlarged the
immunities available to the officials perpetrating constitutional
violations more than it expanded the remedies for those whose rights
were violated in the first instance.44
Interestingly, the Court began sketching the contours of official
immunity under § 1983 a decade before it broadened the applicability
39

Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123.
See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992) (explaining that “[i]n determining
whether there was an immunity at common law that Congress intended to incorporate
into the Civil Rights Act, we look to the most closely analogous torts”); Rudovsky, supra
note 24, at 36 (explaining that a threshold question of the qualified immunity analysis
is “whether and to what degree qualified immunity would have been a defense in
common law analogues to constitutional tort claims”).
41
See Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP.
CT. REV. 139, 145 (2009) (noting the Court-created doctrine used to adapt the scope
of immunities at common law to contemporary government structure).
42
See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807–13 (1982) (qualified immunity
for high-level Presidential aides); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975)
(qualified immunity for school officials); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237–38
(1974) (qualified immunity for Governor of Ohio).
43
See generally City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774–78
(2015) (reversing Court of Appeals and granting qualified immunity to officers who
forcibly entered a mentally disabled woman’s room and shot her multiple times);
Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 349–50 (2014) (per curiam) (reversing Court of
Appeals and granting qualified immunity to officer who went into a private backyard
and onto the deck without a warrant); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020–24
(2014) (reversing District Court and Court of Appeals and granting qualified
immunity to officers who fired fifteen shots to end a high-speed car chase and killed
the driver and passenger); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–86 (2007) (reversing
District Court and Court of Appeals and granting qualified immunity to officer who
ended a car chase by running the driver off the road and rendering him a
quadriplegic).
44
See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 41, at 148–49 (explaining that eliminating the
subjective prong of the qualified immunity analysis “dramatically expanded the
immunity defense and made it more likely that defendants would prevail before trial”);
Evan J. Mandery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity? The Moral Hazards of Extending
Qualified Immunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 513
(1994) (averring that the combination of qualified immunity and the protection for
individual judgment built into many constitutional standards “offer[s] virtually
absolute immunity to public officials”).
40
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of that statute in Monroe, concluding “that § 1983 [was] to be read in
harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses
rather than in derogation of them.”45 Accordingly, in Tenney v.
Brandhove the Court noted a legacy of legislative freedom dating back
to sixteenth century England and held that legislators were entitled to
absolute immunity from civil liability when acting within their
legislative capacity.46
The Court later reinforced a similarly
longstanding tradition of absolute judicial immunity47 and the wellsettled common law rule of absolute immunity for prosecutors.48
Even before its admittedly limited imposition of municipal
liability in Monell, the Court had already begun to rein in the breadth
of the newly expanded § 1983 remedy.49 In Pierson v. Ray, the Court
faced the issue of what immunity, if any, was available to police officers
who arrested a group of clergymen for violating a Mississippi law when,
several years after the arrest, the law was held unconstitutional as
applied to circumstances similar to those at issue.50 In holding that
officers were immune from civil liability if they acted in good faith and
with probable cause, the Court placed a particular emphasis on
fairness, reasoning that a police officer should not have to “choose
between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest
when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he
does.”51 In recognizing that public officials not otherwise entitled to
absolute immunity52 also require some margin for error,53 Pierson’s
“good faith and probable cause” guideline54 was the birth of an
immunity doctrine that would continue to plague the Supreme
45

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–18 (1976) (summarizing the holding of
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 367 (1951)).
46
See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376–79 (expressing disbelief at the notion “that
Congress—itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom—would impinge on a
tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general
language [of § 1983]”).
47
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (comparing legislative and
judicial immunity at common law, explaining that “[t]he immunity of judges for acts
within the judicial role is equally well established, and we presume that Congress would
have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine”).
48
See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421–27.
49
See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555–57.
50
Id. at 549–50.
51
See id. at 555–57.
52
See id. at 555 (noting that “[t]he common law has never granted police officers
an absolute and unqualified immunity”).
53
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S 232, 242 (1974) (“Implicit in the idea that
officials have some immunity—absolute or qualified—for their acts, is a recognition
that they may err.”).
54
Id. at 245.
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Court,55 to baffle lower federal courts,56 and to consume considerable
judicial resources57 in the ensuing decades.
Seven years later, the Court undertook its first qualified immunity
analysis since Pierson.58 In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court clarified the
application of the doctrine, explaining that there were two criteria that
must be met for an official to be eligible for immunity: (1) he must
have had a reasonable basis for the belief in light of all circumstances
existing at the time; and (2) he must have believed in good faith that
the action was lawful.59 Put another way, the Court engaged in a twopronged analysis that assessed the official’s allegedly unconstitutional
act under both objective and subjective standards.60 The Court further
expounded this two-part test shortly thereafter, explaining that
entitlement to immunity requires that an official act with a sincere
belief that he is doing right, and he must not have violated a wellsettled constitutional right—even if the violation resulted from
ignorance or indifference.61
These early cases justified qualified immunity on two primary
bases, both of which were rooted in the rationales of traditional
common law: fairness and overdeterrence.62 The Court explained that
55

See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 223 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 194 (2001); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 800 (1982).
56
See, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting the Circuit
split regarding whether judges or juries should decide if qualified immunity applies);
Harbert Int’l v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 1998) (disagreeing with the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984));
DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795–97 (4th Cir. 1995) (surveying the interpretations
of eight different Courts of Appeal to Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) and
asserting disagreement with all of those constructions of the Court’s holding).
57
See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the
Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (noting that federal
courts have used increasingly more resources for adjudicating immunity claims in
recent years); Charles T. Putnam & Charles T. Ferris, Defending a Maligned Defense: The
Policy Bases of the Qualified Immunity Defense in Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 665, 670 (1992) (describing the scarcity of judicial resources but
the ever-increasing number of § 1983 cases filed in “overburdened federal courts”).
See also Table C-3: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and District,
During
the
12-Month
Period
Ending
March
31,
2015,
U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-3/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics/2015/03/31 (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) (follow “Download Data Table”
hyperlink) (Excluding prisoner petitions, 36,841 of the 281,608 civil cases
(approximately thirteen percent) filed in District Courts from April 1, 2014, to March
31, 2015, were described as “Civil Rights” cases).
58
See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232.
59
See id. at 247–48.
60
See Chen, supra note 57, at 19.
61
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1975).
62
See Scheuer, explaining that official immunity at common law was based on:
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public officials, from police officers to governors, “who fail to make
decisions when they are needed or who do not act to implement
decisions when they are made do not fully and faithfully perform the
duties of their offices.”63 The Court further expounded that the
immunity doctrine recognizes that officials will sometimes make
mistakes and, accordingly, gives them room to err in the performance
of their duties based on the assumption “it is better to risk some error
and possible injury from such error than [for an official] not to decide
or act at all.”64 The Court’s justification demonstrates its concern that
officials would fail to make important decisions or take necessary
actions for fear of incurring civil liability, and that the public good
would ultimately suffer.65 In essence, qualified immunity avoids
“placing police officers between the proverbial rock and a hard place”
when tension arises between the officer’s law enforcement
responsibilities and his constitutional obligations.66
But a mere seven years after deciding Wood v. Strickland, the Court
significantly altered its qualified immunity jurisprudence when it
wholly abandoned the two-part objective-subjective test in favor of a
purely objective analysis: officials would be entitled to immunity so
long as they did not violate clearly established constitutional or
statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known.67 The
Court’s adjusted analysis seems to mirror a shift in its predominant
policy concerns.68 The Court became less concerned with unfairness
and over-deterring officials, and more concerned with the substantial
social burdens at stake in unrestricted litigation of claims against
government officials, such as financing the official’s defense, diverting
[T]wo mutually dependent rationales: (1) the injustice . . . of subjecting
to liability an officer who is required, by . . . his position, to exercise
discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his
willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment
required by the public good.
See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240. See also Chen, supra note 57, at 15 (noting that qualified
immunity jurisprudence in the Supreme Court “began with a focus on fairness and
overdeterrence rationales”).
63
Scheuer, 416. U.S. at 241–42.
64
Id. at 242.
65
See Wood, 420 U.S. at 319–20 (“The imposition of monetary costs for mistakes
which were not unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances would undoubtedly
deter even the most conscientious school decisionmaker from exercising his judgment
independently, forcefully, and in a manner best serving the long term interest . . . .”).
66
Chen, supra note 57, at 16.
67
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
68
See Chen, supra note 57, at 17–18 (“While fairness and overdeterrence still play
a formal role in the Court’s immunity jurisprudence, their function as the driving force
behind qualified immunity was severely diminished after Harlow.”).
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official efforts from important public matters, and dissuading capable
individuals from seeking public office.69 The Court reasoned that
inquiring into the official’s subjective state was incompatible70 with the
effective balancing of important social costs and the individual’s right
to sue an official for violations of his constitutional liberties, requiring
the elimination of the subjective “good faith” prong of the qualified
immunity test.71
Though it has been tweaked somewhat along the way, Harlow v.
Fitzgerald represents the modern test for qualified immunity. The
current standard for qualified immunity involves two different
questions, both of which must be answered affirmatively in order for a
plaintiff’s suit to proceed against an official: (1) Did the defendant
violate the plaintiff’s constitutional right?; and (2) Was a constitutional
right clearly established at the time of the violation?72 In its most recent
formulation, these questions do not need to be answered
sequentially,73 and the Court has left the order of inquiry to the
discretion of the district courts.74
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The legal academic community has criticized the qualified
immunity doctrine on a number of grounds since at least the 1980s.75
Despite these criticisms, in recent years—and particularly since the
beginning of the Roberts era76—the Court has made it ever more
difficult to impose liability on law enforcement officers alleged to have
acted unconstitutionally.77 This extension of the doctrine has occurred
69

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
See id. at 815–18 (explaining why a subjective intent can so rarely be decided on
summary judgment and discussing the disruptive effects to government that broadranging discovery to uncover subjective states of mind can have).
71
See id. at 814–15 (“[T]he dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial—a
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests struck by our prior cases—
requires an adjustment of the ‘good faith’ standard established by our decisions.”).
72
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
73
The Court does, however, state that it is “often beneficial” to answer the two
questions in the above specified order. Id. at 236.
74
See id. at 236–43.
75
See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 233
(2006) (condemning the “lack of transparency” in the Court’s manipulation of the
qualified immunity doctrine and its disregard of the critical role that facts play in the
qualified immunity analysis); Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 27 (criticizing the limitations
on constitutional torts that the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine has imposed and
the potential danger that qualified immunity will redefine substantive constitutional
law).
76
See supra note 43.
77
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 41 HUM. RTS. 5, 5 (2014).
70
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gradually. The decisions that have perpetrated the expansion might
even appear unrelated; but they have nevertheless resulted in one
overarching thematic problem: a lack of accountability.
A. The Surprising Lack of Clarity of the “Clearly Established” Right
One problem with qualified immunity results from the so-called
two-pronged inquiry. In 2001, concerned that disposal of cases based
solely on the “clearly established” prong would “stunt the
development” of constitutional law, the Court mandated that lower
courts first decide whether there was a constitutional violation before
determining whether the right was clearly established.78 The Saucier v.
Katz decision was unpopular,79 to say the least, and in 2009, the Court
unanimously overruled the decision and once again left the
procedural sequence to the discretion of lower courts.80 But because
courts are no longer required to address the two-part inquiry in any
particular order, the practical effect has been precisely what the Court
feared in its Saucier decision: frequent disposal of cases based on the
perceived lack of a “clearly established” right without ever addressing
the merits of the constitutional claim.81
A recent survey of circuit court cases decided since the 2009
Pearson v. Callahan decision demonstrates the frequency with which
lower courts dispose of cases based on a lack of a clearly established
law.82 The study, which analyzed 844 published and unpublished
courts of appeal opinions decided between 2009 and 2012,
encompassing 1,460 total claims, found that courts granted qualified
immunity in 1,055 of the claims, or approximately 72% of the time.83
In 534 (or nearly 51%) of the claims wherein a court granted
immunity, the court concluded that the right asserted was not clearly
established.84 So in more than half of the claims in which courts
granted immunity, the basis for the holding was the absence of clearly
established law.
78

See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2009) (noting that lower court
judges “have not been reticent in their criticism,” that application of the Saucier rule
“has not always been enthusiastic,” and that even some members of the Court were
critical).
80
Id. at 236.
81
See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort
Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602–03 (2011).
82
See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2015).
83
Id.
84
See id. at 31–32.
79
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But perhaps somewhat ironically, the concept of a “clearly”
established right is in and of itself less than clear, and a great deal of
confusion exists over what rights fall within this vague classification.85
In essence, approximately fifty percent of the time,86 a court’s decision
to grant immunity to an official is based on a muddled and uncertain
legal precept. To qualify as clearly established, “a right must be
sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood
that what he is doing violates that right.”87 There are few unambiguous
bright-line rules in modern constitutional jurisprudence. Instead,
most doctrines are articulated as relatively vague standards or
balancing tests.88 In addition, because there are considerable
distinctions in the structure, aim, and available alternative remedies of
various constitutional rights, the general-purpose nature of qualified
immunity is problematic.89 Defining a clearly established law is
straightforward when the right is laid out in a stable and fairly specific
doctrine, but when the rule changes, the new law only becomes clearly
established when a clarifying court decision is handed down.90 When
such constitutional rights are violated, qualified immunity allows
officials to avoid liability because of a failure to anticipate
developments in the law.91 And although the Court held in 2002 that
there need not be a case on point in order to find clearly established
law,92 it has nevertheless continued to grant qualified immunity in the
absence of similar precedent.93 Unsurprisingly, lower courts struggle
with the question of whether a right is clearly established, and the
circuits have developed markedly varying approaches to the inquiry.94
Finally, despite multiple attempts to clarify the doctrine over the
years, it seems that the Supreme Court has only further added to the
confusion of lower courts. Indeed, almost without fail, Supreme Court
cases since Pearson have apparently further expanded the qualified
immunity doctrine by upholding its application in all manner of
85

See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of
Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 329 (1995).
86
This percentage assumes the reliability of the aforementioned survey.
87
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).
88
See Chen, supra note 57, at 50.
89
See Jeffries, supra note 27, at 859.
90
See id.
91
Id.
92
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (explaining that “officials can still
be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances”).
93
See Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 6.
94
See Jeffries, supra note 27, at 852 (“[D]etermining whether an officer violated
‘clearly established’ law has proved to be a mare’s nest of complexity and confusion.”).
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diverse situations—seemingly in every set of circumstances with which
it has been presented.95
B. An Overconfidence in Overdeterrence
The judicial system’s somewhat naïve faith in the power of civil
suits as a deterrent has inadvertently produced another problem in
qualified immunity jurisprudence.96 This belief has generated concern
in the Supreme Court about overdeterrence—the notion that fear of
being sued “is so strong that it can ‘dampen the ardor of all but the
most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.’”97 This trepidation about too
much deterrence and its potentially chilling effect on government
operations has played a powerful role in shaping Court decisions
toward limiting civil remedies.98 Of course, lawsuits are intended to
have this deterrent effect—indeed, they are relied upon to have such
effect as part of our system of accountability for government officials.
Unfortunately, reality suggests that the deterrent power of lawsuits is
not quite as potent as the Supreme Court envisions.99
The Court specifically fears that financial liability, in the form of
paying compensatory damages to victims whose constitutional rights
were violated by an officer, will be a vehicle of overdeterrence.100 The
widespread practice of indemnification, however, means that
individual officers are almost never financially responsible for civil
judgments against them, practically eliminating any fiscal motivation

95

See, e.g., Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (holding that prison
officials were entitled to qualified immunity after failing to prevent an inmate’s death
because “[e]ven if the [prison’s] suicide screening and prevention measures
contained . . . shortcomings” there was no precedent at the time that would have made
it clear that the system was unconstitutional”); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088,
2094 (2012) (officers entitled to qualified immunity because the Court has never held
that there is a “right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by
probable cause”); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (former Attorney
General entitled to qualified immunity where he detained terrorism suspects using the
pretext of a federal material-witness statute because the arrest was objectively
reasonable even if it was improperly motivated).
96
See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2010) (explaining
that the Court believes that being sued or even the threat of being sued is enough to
make officials act within the laws).
97
Id. at 1025 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982)).
98
See id.
99
See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 894 n.41
(2014) (explaining that the Court has never given any empirical evidence to support
its belief in the deterrent power of lawsuits).
100
See id. at 893.
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for avoiding harmful conduct.101 In fact, in many instances, even the
police department that employs the officer suffers no direct financial
consequences because police litigation costs and damages awards are
often paid from a city or insurer’s general budget.102 Therefore, the
police department is not financially penalized, and thus has no
incentive to discipline the officer or attempt to prevent him from
repeating the unconstitutional behavior in the future. And because
law enforcement officials are often unaware of the allegations set forth
in lawsuits filed against them or their employees, officers’ conduct
often goes uninvestigated and undisciplined, and allegations of
unconstitutional conduct do not affect performance reviews or
opportunities for promotion.103
Finally, although many law
enforcement officers claim that the threat of incurring liability deters
them from misconduct, studies contrarily indicate that potential
liability does not actually alter most officers’ on-the-job actions.104
C. The Unintended Upshot of a Universally Applicable Standard
Although many of the weaknesses of qualified immunity can, for
the most part, be considered unintended consequences, one
significant flaw was the Court’s deliberate decision to utilize a one-sizefits-all standard. In early qualified immunity decisions, the Court
acknowledged the possibility that the doctrine might apply differently
depending on the type of official involved in a particular situation.105
But, as it so commonly does, the Court altered its approach. For nearly
four decades, the Court has applied the qualified immunity doctrine
as a standard applicable to all officials who do not enjoy absolute
immunity.106
Indeed, the Court has been explicit about its
unwillingness “to complicate qualified immunity analysis by making
the scope or extent of immunity turn on the precise nature of various

101

See id. at 938–40.
Id. at 957.
103
See Schwartz, supra note 96, at 1076–77.
104
Id. at 1077–78.
105
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (“[I]n varying scope, a qualified
immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation
being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and
all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time . . . .”); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 554–55 (1967) (distinguishing judges, who are entitled to absolute
immunity, and police officers, who enjoy good-faith immunity); Chen, supra note 85,
at 287–89.
106
See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1978) (explaining that officials
not entitled to absolute immunity “could rely only on the qualified immunity
described” in earlier cases); Chen, supra note 85, at 289.
102
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officials’ duties.”107 In so doing, the Court has overextended the
doctrine. It is essentially providing too much protection for lower-level
officers because all officials not entitled to absolute immunity now
enjoy immunity that the Court “ha[d] developed for a quite different
group of high public office holders.”108 This is perhaps most
problematic when a plaintiff alleges Fourth Amendment violations
because the qualified immunity doctrine provides officers with two
layers of liability protection: qualified immunity’s reasonableness
standard on top of the reasonableness already embodied in Fourth
Amendment substantive law.109
D. Annihilating Accountability
Of course, the most outwardly evident and alarming problem with
qualified immunity jurisprudence has been its cumulative erosion of
law enforcement accountability.
Perhaps Erwin Chemerinsky
summarized it best when he noted that “[i]n recent years, the court
has made it very difficult, and often impossible, to hold police officers
and the governments that employ them accountable for civil rights
violations.”110 Many of the aforementioned procedural and substantive
problems with the qualified immunity doctrine have contributed to
what might be considered a deleterious byproduct. But recent Court
decisions have also demonstrated a willingness to extend immunity in
even the most egregious circumstances.111
For example, in Plumhoff v. Rickard, the Court held that three
officers did not use excessive force and were entitled to qualified
immunity when they had collectively fired fifteen shots at a fleeing car,
causing the deaths of the driver and passenger.112 The incident ensued
107

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987).
Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109
See Chen, supra note 85, at 296.
110
Erwin Chemerinsky, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supreme-courtprotects-bad-cops.html?_r=0.
111
See, e.g., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774–78 (2015)
(officers forcibly entered a mentally disabled woman’s room and shot her several
times); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 349–50 (2014) (per curiam) (officers went
into a private backyard and onto the deck without a warrant because an alleged car
thief “might have fled” there); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–86 (2007) (officer
ended a car chase by running the driver off the road and rendering him a
quadriplegic). See also Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting “All But the Plainly
Incompetent” (and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2012)
(opining that “[p]ublic officials can be more certain than ever before that qualified
immunity will shield them from suits for money damages even if their actions violate
the constitutional rights of another”).
112
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017–18, 2021–24 (2014).
108
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after one of the officers stopped the vehicle for having only one
working headlight and, rather than exit the vehicle as the officer
instructed, the driver instead sped away, prompting the officer and
several others to give chase.113 The Supreme Court disagreed with the
district court and the court of appeals, which had both concluded that
the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.114 In overturning the courts below, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the use of deadly force was permissible because the
driver “posed a grave public safety risk” and that firing fifteen times
was not unreasonable because “the officers need not stop shooting
until the threat is over.”115 Somewhat similarly, in Brosseau v. Haugen,
the Court held that an officer was entitled to immunity when she shot
an unarmed man in the back through the window of his Jeep—which
was not moving116—as a means of preventing his escape.117 The Court
acknowledged that the officer’s actions probably “fell in the ‘hazy
border between excessive and acceptable force,’” but that previous
Court decisions “by no means ‘clearly establish’ that Brosseau’s
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.”118
V. THE PROBLEM OF POLICE USE OF FORCE
The qualified immunity doctrine presents myriad problems in
both its conception and application, such that this Comment could not
hope to address them all. But those mentioned in the previous section
are among those of particular relevance to the recent questions
surrounding police misconduct. Indeed, the link between police
violence and the vast confusion regarding “clearly established” rights,
or of giving lower courts complete discretion to address the twopronged test in whichever order they see fit, might not be obvious at
first blush. But it is not difficult to see how qualified immunity’s
gradual deterioration of law enforcement’s accountability plays a role
in the current predicament between the police and those they are
tasked with policing.
113

Id. at 2017.
Id. at 2016–17.
115
Id. at 2021–22. The Court also reasoned that the presence of a passenger in the
front seat should play no part in its analysis. Id. at 2022.
116
Despite the fact that the vehicle was not moving, the officer nevertheless
claimed that she shot Haugen in the back because she was “‘fearful for the other
officers on foot who [she] believed were in the immediate area, [and] for the occupied
vehicles in [Haugen’s] path and for any other citizens who might be in the area.’”
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) (per curiam).
117
Id. at 195–97.
118
Id. at 201 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
114
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A. The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing Prescribes Trust
and Legitimacy
In response to the officer-perpetrated violence and the national
reaction thereto, President Obama created the Task Force on 21st
Century Policing119 in December 2014, to determine best practices for
strengthening relationships between law enforcement and the public
while also aiming to reduce crime.120 In its Final Report, the Task Force
set forth myriad recommendations and action steps to implement such
recommendations, all of which aim at a paramount umbrella objective:
fostering trust and legitimacy between the police and the communities
they serve.121 The Final Report is comprehensive in that it covers six
general topics and recommends collaboration not only among the
various levels of government,122 but between individual law
enforcement agencies and local schools,123 higher-learning
institutions,124 other local jurisdictions,125 and individual and corporate
members of the community.126 But the scope of the Task Force’s
assignment was limited to police-community interactions, and it
advocates for holistic evaluation of the criminal justice system in order
to determine a plan for comprehensive criminal justice reform.127
Establishing police accountability is a palpable recurring theme
of the Final Report. For example, the Task Force encourages law
enforcement agencies to foster transparency and ensure accountability
by making departmental policies freely available to citizens, regularly
posting data about stops, summonses, arrests, crime, and the like on
the department website, and promptly and candidly communicating
with the community about serious incidents—including alleged officer

119

See generally Community Oriented Policing Services Office, President’s Task Force,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/policingtaskforce (last visited Apr. 24,
2016).
120
See Press Release, Fact Sheet: Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Dec. 18,
2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/fact-sheet-taskforce-21st-century-policing.
121
See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1–4 (2015) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE].
122
See id. at 7–8.
123
See id. at 15, 41–43, 47–49, 50.
124
See id. at 16, 55, 59, 95–96.
125
See id. at 28–29, 90.
126
See, e.g., id. at 19–20, 26, 35, 44–46.
127
See TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 5–8. The Task Force noted that many citizens
think of police as the “face” of the criminal justice system, and may blame the police
for policies with which they disagree such as drug laws, sentencing protocol, and
incarceration rules. Id. at 7.

DE STEFAN (DO NOT DELETE)

562

2/21/2017 10:10 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:543

misconduct.128 Additionally, the Task Force emphasizes the need for
policy reform to control the use of police force and urges departments
to mandate external, independent criminal investigations for cases of
officer-involved shootings, in-custody deaths, and fatal use of force in
order to demonstrate transparency and rebuild trust.129
B. The Police and the Policed: A Relationship in Need of Repair
Unsurprisingly, police shootings generally tend to produce
tension between the police and the policed.130 That most of the
incidents propagated through various forms of media since 2014 have
involved the deaths of unarmed citizens at the hands of police131 has
only made matters worse. Regardless of whether the number of police
slayings has in fact increased, or whether the media is simply giving
more attention to such occurrences, the general relationships between
law enforcement agencies and communities nationwide are likely even
further strained than in the case of more isolated, or seemingly more
isolated, events.132 In addition, multiple declinations of grand juries to
indict officers involved in high-profile slayings of unarmed citizens has
further exacerbated the problem, inciting outrage, inspiring
protests,133 and raising critical questions about the extent of police
accountability.134
128

See id. at 13.
See id. at 19, 21.
130
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 74 (1998).
131
See, e.g., Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouritown-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html?_r=0; Justin Fenton, Autopsy of Freddie Gray
Shows “High-Energy” Impact, BALT. SUN (June 24, 2015, 10:25 AM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-freddie-grayautopsy-20150623-story.html; Abby Ohlheiser, Death of Tamir Rice, 12-Year-Old Shot by
Cleveland Police, Ruled a Homicide, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/12/12/death-oftamir-rice-12-year-old-shot-by-cleveland-police-ruled-a-homicide/.
132
See Walter Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent Investigations
of Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. 235, 236 (2015) (discussing how apparent racial
targeting by police generates distrust, which boils over from time to time—for
example, in 2014 in response to the deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, and several
other high-profile police slayings).
133
See Julie Bosman & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protests Follow Shooting of a
Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/
police-say-mike-brown-was-killed-after-struggle-for-gun.html; J. David Goodman & Al
Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grandjury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-ericgarner.html?_r=0.
134
See Vincent Warren, Building Trust and Legitimacy: Listening Session before the
129
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Unfortunately, while the FBI plans to improve its system for
gathering information about the use of force by law enforcement by
2017, its data collection up to this point has been less-than-stellar.135
And although the Washington Post undertook a year-long investigation
in 2015 in order to accurately track the number of fatal shootings by
on-duty police officers,136 the fallibility of previous federal data makes
it impossible to ascertain how that total compares to prior years.137
Moreover, the Post’s report does not include other types of deaths at
the hands of police, such as in-custody deaths138 or deaths resulting
from Tasers.139 However, it is noteworthy that the Post’s figure of 986
lethal police shootings is more than double the FBI’s average annual
tally for the preceding decade.140 So, if nothing else, this stark disparity
reveals that such occurrences are substantially more prevalent than
anyone was aware.
Of course, the Post’s figures are subject to varying interpretations,
each of which has some merit. Some may consider the recent
shootings to be an unfortunate but nonetheless routine consequence
of enforcing the laws. On the other hand, nationwide protests141 have
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, CENTERFORCONSTITUTIONALRIGHTS 3–4
(Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/CCR
Testimony_PolicingTaskforce_20150113Final.pdf (explaining that the repeated
failure of grand juries to indict officers who engage in brutality, and the grant of
immunity to some officers involved in Eric Garner’s death “demonstrate a worrying
lack of accountability or consequence for police misconduct”).
135
Kimberly Kindy et al., A Year of Reckoning: Police Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000, WASH.
POST (Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/26
/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000/.
136
See Sandhya Somashekhar & Steven Rich, Final Tally: Police Shot and Killed 986
People in 2015, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2016, 6:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/final-tally-police-shot-and-killed-984-people-in-2015/2016/01/05/3ec7a404b3c5-11e5-a76a-0b5145e8679a_story.html.
137
In other words, it is truly impossible to determine whether there have actually
been more police shootings of civilians, or whether the media has simply been giving
more coverage to these incidents.
138
Forty-seven people were killed in police custody in the United States in 2015.
The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN,
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-countedpolice-killings-us-database (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
139
Fifty people died as a result of officers with Tasers in 2015. Id.
140
Id.
141
See, e.g., Lauren Gambino et al., Thousands March to Protest Against Police Brutality
in Major US Cities, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2014/dec/13/marchers-protest-police-brutality-new-york-washingtonboston; William Mathis, Hundreds Rally in New York City to Protest Police Brutality,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2015, 7:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
rise-up-october-rally-nyc_us_562c0fd9e4b0aac0b8fd23f3; Protests Follow Decision Not to
File Charges in Minneapolis Police Shooting, CBS (Mar. 30, 2016, 8:02 PM),
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demonstrated that many others consider civilian deaths at the hands
of police officers to be an insult to constitutional rights. And surely
the opinions of many Americans lie somewhere on the spectrum in
between. While the statistical truth may forever remain a mystery, one
thing is clear: the need for change.142 The American public has lost
trust in its law enforcement, not only because of the perceived
frequency of the use of lethal force, but because of subsequent
investigations into such incidents, which many view as biased.143 The
nation is calling for reform,144 and various government agencies,145
branches of local government,146 and even the President147 have
responded to the outcry. But although the need for change has been
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jamar-clark-protests-follow-decision-not-to-filecharges-in-minneapolis-police-shooting/.
142
The urgent necessity is demonstrated by the handful of police departments
nationally, including Philadelphia, Seattle, and San Francisco, which have already
begun implementing specific recommendations of the Task Force. See Community
Oriented Policing Services Office, Task Force Recommendations Implementation Map, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2827# (last visited Feb.
10, 2016).
143
See Katz, supra note 132, at 235.
144
See, e.g., Michelle Basch, Demonstrators Call for Change at Public Hearing on Fairfax
Police Practices, WTOP (Sept. 15, 2015, 1:39 AM), http://wtop.com/fairfax-county/
2015/09/demonstrators-call-for-change-at-public-hearing-on-fairfax-policepractices/slide/1/; Phil Helsel, Former Tennis Star James Blake Calls for Police Change After
Mistaken Arrest, NBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2015, 9:41 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/
us-news/former-tennis-star-james-blake-calls-nyc-police-change-after-n426211;
Meghan Keneally & Evan Simon, Law Enforcement Analysts Call for Changes to Police
Training After Recent Incidents, ABC NEWS (May 5, 2015, 6:23 PM), http://abcnews.go.
com/News/law-enforcement-analysts-call-police-training-recentincidents/story?id=30827523.
145
See, e.g., Mark Berman et al., Justice Department Sues the City of Ferguson to Force
Policing Reform, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2016, 7:52 AM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/10/ferguson-demands-changes-to-agreementreforming-police-tactics-justice-dept-criticizes-unnecessary-delay/; Kindy et al., supra
note 135.
146
See, e.g., Ralph Ellis et al., After Fatal Shootings by Police, Chicago Mayor Calls for
Changes in Officer Training, CNN (Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/27/
us/chicago-police-shooting/; Jayne Miller, Baltimore Mayor Pushes for Changes to Fire
Police Officers, WBAL-TV (Oct. 21, 2015, 6:11 PM), http://www.wbaltv.com/news/
baltimore-mayor-pushes-for-changes-to-fire-police-officers/35968256.
147
See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Calls for Changes in Policing After Task Force
Report, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/politics/
obama-calls-for-changes-in-policing-after-task-force-report.html?_r=0 (urging local law
enforcement to consider independent criminal investigations and independent
prosecutors in situations involving police use of force); Alex Johnson, Obama: U.S.
Cracking Down on ‘Militarization’ of Local Police, NBC NEWS (May 18, 2015, 7:23 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-cracking-down-militarization-localpolice-n360381 (barring the federal government from providing local law
enforcement with tanks, grenade launchers, and other heavy military equipment).
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duly acknowledged, the question of how to implement comprehensive
reform on a national scale remains largely unresolved.
VI. AMENDING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AS A CATALYST FOR
CURBING POLICE VIOLENCE
Altering the qualified immunity doctrine is an excellent way to
begin the path to restoring trust by establishing a much-needed sense
of accountability. Civil remedies are a good starting point because, as
repeated failures to indict officers—even where video footage of the
incident exists—have demonstrated, accountability under the criminal
law is a far-off possibility, if it is possible at all. Prosecutors are generally
disinclined to bring charges against law enforcement officers,148 and
grand juries are equally as hesitant to indict them.149 Independent
investigations, as suggested by the Task Force, are an excellent idea,
but establishing a feasible system nationwide would take both time and
the cooperation of thousands of local law enforcement divisions
nationwide. On the other hand, the Supreme Court could begin to
relax the stringent immunity afforded to police officers with a single
opinion, and could thus be implemented relatively quickly.
Of course, this is easier said than done. The Court has
increasingly enlarged the immunity afforded to police officers in its
recent decisions, and any 180-degree turnaround would likely require
a change in Court composition. Nevertheless, the current Court can
reinvigorate the usefulness of civil remedies for constitutional
violations by simply providing more guidance and clarification
regarding qualified immunity. In elucidating the contours of the
doctrine and demonstrating its proper application, the Court can
enhance accountability and help to repair trust between law
enforcement and their respective communities.
The concept of a clearly established right is, in many ways, a
problem that requires solving. A substantial number of cases are
disposed of on the premise that a right was not “clearly established”—
yet lower courts have struggled for years with what those words actually

148

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 130, at 85. Reasons that prosecutors may
opt not to pursue brutality charges against police officers include: (1) the typically
close working relationship between district attorneys and officers; (2) difficulty in
convincing juries that officers committed a crime (as opposed to merely making a
mistake); and (3) lack of information about prosecutable cases or systems for reviewing
potentially prosecutable cases. Id. at 86.
149
See id. (explaining that even seemingly foolproof cases against on-duty officers
can fail because of juries’ tendencies to support the police and their reluctance to find
officers guilty on criminal charges).
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mean.150 Arguably, then, at least some officers are escaping liability
simply because of the Court’s repeated failures to establish consistency
and clarity in its qualified immunity jurisprudence. But if the Court
used qualified immunity opinions to demonstrate what qualifies as a
clearly established right by meticulously outlining its reasoning in
answering whether a set of facts implicates such a right, the Court
could alleviate some confusion. In other words, rather than taking
cases simply to overturn the lower courts’ denial of immunity, which
arguably only further clouds the issue, it could take cases to affirm
those denials or, alternatively, to reverse lower courts’ grant of
immunity. By so doing, the Court can give examples of what
constitutes a right that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right,”151 and can give lower courts somewhat of a guide to follow.
By elucidating the contours of the clearly established right, the
Court would alleviate some of the confusion of lower courts and ensure
that they are in fact applying that portion of the test properly. Proper
application of this prong directly promotes accountability, as the
public can rest assured that, at least in that regard, cases are not being
disposed of based merely on perplexity and uncertainty. Moreover,
increased confidence about the clearly established prong could foster
a willingness to take on the second part of the test and, in so doing,
advance the development of constitutional law and clarify further
constitutional rights.
The Court could also accept that its attempts at a general standard
for all classes of officials that are not otherwise entitled to absolute
immunity has been problematic and hugely unsuccessful. Though the
Court apparently fears “complicat[ing]” qualified immunity,152 the
doctrine is obviously quite complicated as is, and adopting more
particularized classes of officials with standards of immunity that are
more appropriate to each would not only assist lower courts in properly
analyzing immunity, but would promote justice in constitutional tort
litigation. For example, the Court could classify officials based on the
approximate number of people with whom they come in contact, and
that might therefore bring civil suits against them.153 A governor could
150

See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).
152
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
153
See Mandery, supra note 44, at 514 (explaining that many concerns justifying
qualified immunity for higher-level officials do not apply to lower-level officials, whose
decisions typically only affect people they directly come into contact with, and whose
tasks can be duplicated by other low-level officials, so any time spent defending a
lawsuit is not an excessive governmental burden).
151
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theoretically face a lawsuit from any resident of the state because a
governor’s decisions potentially affect all citizens of the state, such that
more stringent protection—much like the standard afforded to all
officials now—is appropriate. But law enforcement officers, who come
in contact with only the residents of one town, city, or perhaps
county,154 risk possible suits from a much smaller pool of people. The
threat of litigation would therefore be much less crippling on
governmental function, and immunity protection need not be so
rigorous. In the case of allegations of Fourth Amendment violations,
in light of the already-existing reasonableness standard, immunity may
be inappropriate altogether.
In addition, the Court could do its proverbial homework and take
notice of the widespread indemnification of officers that often results
in a complete absence of financial or employment-related
consequences for law enforcement. If the Court stopped relying on its
own intuition, and instead came to grip with the facts, it would likely
realize that it has been overzealous in protecting low-level officers, and
be inclined to alter course somewhat.
By beginning to mend the qualified immunity doctrine in these
ways, the Court will allow more civil suits for the vindication of
constitutional rights to succeed. This will help reduce the public
mentality—strengthened by recent events—that cops get away with
everything, in every regard.
Civil suits avoid subjecting law
enforcement to the criminal liability that many laypersons believe is
warranted. While this may be true in select circumstances, reality
demonstrates that criminal charges are highly unlikely to stick against
a police officer. But allowing more civil suits to go forward will serve
as an important reminder to both civilians and law enforcement that
the police are not above the law, and that they are held accountable
for their wrongdoings. In turn, this accountability will begin to heal
the relationship between law enforcement and communities; it can
serve as the first step on the long path to rebuilding the trust that is so
crucial.
VII. CONCLUSION
By adopting different immunity standards for high-level and lowlevel officials, clarifying the vagueness surrounding the definition of a
“clearly established” right, and acknowledging the real-world effects of
indemnification, the Court can begin to repair some of the substantial
154

In fact, more likely than not, an officer will only ever come in contact with some
as opposed to all residents of the town, city, or county.
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flaws in its qualified immunity jurisprudence. As it does, more
constitutional tort suits will be permitted to succeed—just as the Court
in Monroe v. Pape intended all those years ago—thereby fostering law
enforcement accountability. Because criminal liability for police
officers is, as a practical matter, nearly impossible in many situations,
and because strategies like improving police training and recruiting
tactics will likely take years to effectively implement on a national scale,
civil liability is the immediate answer. Civil suits are the fastest and
most efficient way to ensure the imposition of at least some
repercussions for uses of force that the nation (though not the legal
system) have considered to be excessive, unnecessary, and, sometimes,
outrageous. Civil liability can be an initial, but potentially powerful,
way to demonstrate that our officers are our guardians and that they
are accountable to us—a principle that it seems many members of both
the police and the policed have forgotten recently.
Of course, large-scale police reform and everything it entails,
including exploring ways to make criminal liability more feasible, are
crucial and will serve a prominent role in effecting change in due time.
But amending the application of qualified immunity to allow for
increased civil liability for police violations of constitutional rights is
the most immediate way to rebuild trust and begin healing the citizenpolice relationship.

